Pre-Existing Condition Claim

Kathleen Mullins V Derek Gray (2004)

CA (Civ Div) (Mummery LJ, Longmore LJ, Gage LJ) 28/10/2004

Damages - Personal Injury

General Damages : Depression : Egg Shell Skull : Pain And Suffering : Pre-Exisiting Psychiatric Illness : Exacerbation Of Pain And Suffering : Egg Shell Skull Rule : Psychiatric Disorders : Anxiety : Medical Evidence : Assessment Of Damages

Where a claim for pain and suffering had been made on the basis that the injury had been exacerbated by an existing condition of anxiety and depression, the trial judge had erred by making a small award on the basis that there had been no evidence of a recognised psychiatric condition. The judge had to make an assessment as to whether the injury, whether or not it had been heightened by an existing condition, had been caused by the accident.

The appellant (M) appealed against an award of damages made in a personal injury claim resulting from a road traffic accident caused by the respondent (G). The accident had been a rear end shunt in which M had suffered a whiplash injury. Liability had been admitted and the trial judge had made a global award of damages of £12,900 which included £6000 for general damages. The judge had found that M had suffered, at the time of the accident, from a psychiatric illness in the form of anxiety and depression which had heightened her pain and suffering.

The judge held that her pre-existing condition had been exacerbated by the accident, but he refused to grant an award of damages at the top end of the scale, despite a finding of an appalling history of pain and suffering, on the basis that there had been a lack of evidence to support a finding that she had suffered from a recognised psychiatric condition

HELD: The judge had erred in the award of general damages. His attention had been deflected by the medical evidence, which although finding that M had suffered an exacerbation of a psychiatric illness in the form of anxiety and depression, her condition had fallen short of a recognised personality disorder. M's claim however had been for pain and suffering said to have been caused by the whiplash injury. The fact that pain and suffering had been heightened by M's personality disorder had not made it any less a claim for pain and suffering. M had been more susceptible to pain because of her condition, but this was a typical egg-shell skull case.

If the claim had been for psychiatric injury then medical evidence would have been required to prove that injury, however, that was not the case where the claim was for personal injury in the form of pain and suffering. Whilst the judge had been correct to find that the pain and suffering had been caused by the whiplash injury, he had erred by relying on the expert's view that M had not been suffering from a recognised psychiatric disorder as grounds for reducing the award.

The judge had to make an assessment as to whether the injury, whether or not it had been heightened by an existing condition, had been caused by the accident. Taking the finding that M had suffered an appalling history of illness since the accident, which had been heightened as a result of her enduring condition, the judge's awarded for general damages had been too low. The right bracket for a whiplash injury of the kind suffered by M was between £17,500 and £22,500. In the circumstances the award would be substituted with one of £20,000

Appeal allowed.
Counsel:
For the appellant: Philip Mead
For the respondent: Neil R L Crawley

Solicitors:
For the appellant: Owen White
For the respondent: Praxis Partners (Leeds)
LTL 28/10/2004 EXTEMPORE (Unreported elsewhere)
Document No. AC9300055