Ankle Injury Claim

Julie Bygrave V Thomas Cook Tour Operations Ltd (2003)

Given the nature of the respondent's ankle injury the district judge had been correct to hold that that injury was "severe" within the meaning of the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines and the judge had not otherwise erred in his assessment of damages.

Personal Injury - Damages

CA (Ward LJ, Scott Baker LJ) 5/11/2003

LTL 5/11/2003 EXTEMPORE (Unreported elsewhere)

Document No.: AC9400202

Appeal by the defendant ('T') from the order of Deputy District Judge Ashworth on 17 July 2003 awarding the respondent ('B') damages of £48,697 including interest for injuries and consequential losses arising from an accident in Cyprus on 25 June 1999 during the course of a holiday provided by T, liability having been admitted. B had slipped on a wet surface at her hotel and suffered a tri-malleolar fracture dislocation of her right ankle that had required the insertion of pins and rods. On appeal T argued that:

(i) the judge had erred in making an award of £19,000 for damages as he had wrongly categorised B's injuries as "severe" within the meaning in the Judicial Studies Board ('JSB') guidelines. The long term consequence of her injury did not justify that conclusion, rather, it was a "moderate" injury that should have attracted an award of between £7,000 and £14,000;

(ii) an award of £19,240 for future care and assistance on the basis that B would need a cleaner until she was 70 years of age was flawed. B had been a cleaner prior to the accident and had continued to be employed in such a capacity for some time after the accident. There was no reason that she could not complete domestic chores in her own home. Moreover, she had given up that part-time cleaning job for a full-time sedentary position, which change was the real reason that she was unable to perform domestic chores; and

(iii) an award of £100 per annum for the rest of B's life to take account of her greater use of taxis in the future than an average person was unsupported by the evidence. There was no indication as to the use that B had made of taxis or if she had done so at all.

HELD: (1) In consideration of general damages it was impossible for the court to interfere with the assessment of the judge below who had been particularly well placed to judge the evidence of the expert and B's evidence as to her levels of pain and the effect on her life of the injury. That injury was well within the bracket of a "severe" injury and within the range of cases cited by B. The decision was not so manifestly excessive that the court could interfere nor was it palpably wrong.

(2) Moreover, T's submissions as to domestic chores were unattractive. There was abundant evidence of the adverse effects on B of the burden of domestic chores. The judge below had, and had been entitled to, rely on that evidence to hold that B's disabilities affected her abilities in that regard.

The fact that she had struggled on as a cleaner after her accident was nothing to the point. She was entitled to compensation for the pain that the completion of domestic chores gave her. Moreover, her decision to leave part-time work was a reasonable one based on the need to find sedentary employment. The consequence of her tiredness naturally followed from that.

(3) The issue of the use of taxis could be reduced to the question as to whether the district judge's conclusion that B would use taxis more than an average person was a sustainable one. There was in fact abundant evidence as to limitations on B's ability to travel. In those circumstances, the inference that B would have to rely more on taxis than the average person was one that the district judge had been entitled to draw and one with which the court would not interfere.

Appeal dismissed.